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In an important recent study, Tobia (2015) gave participants a vignette about a person who gets into an
accident:
Phineas is extremely kind; he really enjoys helping people. He is also employed as a railroad worker. One day at
work, a railroad explosion causes a large iron spike to fly out and into his head, and he is immediately taken for
emergency surgery. The doctors manage to remove the iron spike and their patient is fortunate to survive.
However, in some ways this man after the accident is remarkably different from Phineas before the accident.
Phineas before the accident was extremely kind and enjoyed helping people, but the man after the accident is
now extremely cruel; he even enjoys harming people.
Participants then received a simple question. Consider the man after the accident. Is that man Phineas, or
would it be more accurate to say that he is not Phineas at all?
Participants answered this question on a scale that went from completely agreeing that the man is
Phineas to completely agreeing that he is not Phineas. Strikingly, the mean response was at about the
midpoint of  the scale. In other words, people regarded this as a difficult case. They were drawn in some way
toward the view that the man after the accident is Phineas, but they were also drawn in some way toward the
view that he is not Phineas. Since this is an intuition about a case of  radical moral change, let’s refer to it as
the moral change intuition.
In what follows, we will be looking in detail at recent empirical findings regarding the moral change
intuition, but before we discuss any of  those findings, it is important to see that the intuition is deeply
surprising just in itself. After all, there seems to be some straightforward sense in which people think the man
after the accident is obviously Phineas, and it’s hard to see what people could possibly mean by saying that he is
not.
To illustrate, suppose the man went to a bank and tried to withdraw money. People would
presumably not find it remotely plausible to say: “You can’t withdraw money from Phineas’s account – you
aren’t Phineas.” Similar points would no doubt hold for many of  the other ordinary practices that dependon
intuitions about personal identity (see Starmans & Bloom, 2018). In short, it seems that we face a puzzle
about the moral change intuition. Given that there is a sense in which the man after the accident is obviously
Phineas, what exactly do people mean when they say that he is not Phineas?
I will argue that if  we want to understand people's intuitions in cases like this one, it will prove
helpful to look to frameworks from a literature that might at first seem quite remote from the study of
personal identity. Specifically, I suggest that it might be helpful to look to the literature on what are called dual
character concepts (Del Pinal & Reuter, 2017; Flanagan & Hannikainen, in press; Guo, Dweck & Markman, in
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press; Knobe, Prasada & Newman, 2013; Leslie, 2015; Liao, Meskin & Knobe, 2020; Reuter, 2019; Tobia,
Newman & Knobe, 2020).
What is a dual character concept? For a simple example, consider the criteria people ordinarily
employ to determine whether or not someone counts as a scientist. Now imagine a physics professor. She
spends her days running experiments and writing up papers, but she doesn’t really care about getting at the
truth regarding scientific questions and is dogmatically clinging to some theory in a way that ignores all of  the
evidence. Is this person a scientist?
In cases like this one, people tend to agree with both of  the following two statements:
(1) There is a sense in which this person is a scientist.
(2) Ultimately when you think about what it really means to be a scientist, you would have to say that
this person is not truly a scientist.
The fact that people agree with both of  these statementsprovides some evidence that people actually have
two different criteria for the application of  this concept, hence the claim that the concept shows “dual
character.”
My claim will be that the frameworks developed within the study of  dual character concepts give us
the tools we need to understand the moral change intuition. On this view, people actually have the following
pair of  intuitions:
(1) There is a sense in which the man after the accident is Phineas.
(2) Ultimately, when you think about what it really means to be Phineas, you would have to say that
the man after the accident is not truly Phineas.
The complicated intuition people have about the man after the accident – that he is obviously Phineas in one
sense but is somehow not really Phineas in another – can then be understood as just one example of  a far
broader phenomenon, and it can be explained using the frameworks that have been developed to understand
that phenomenon more generally.
1. A framework for understanding dual character concepts
In this first section, I introduce a general framework for understanding dual character concepts.
Then, in the remaining sections, we will be looking at specific empirical results regarding the moral change
intuition and using this framework to explain those results.
Within existing research, the study of  dual character concepts has focused on people’s use of
concepts that might seem a bit distant from the moral change intuition, and I recognize that much of  the
material in this first section might at first appear to be irrelevant to the specific phenomenon we are trying to
explain. But I promise, although many elements of this framework were originally developed to understand
other concepts, every one of  them will be used verydirectly in subsequent sections to explain the results of
experiments on the moral change intuition.
Characteristic values
To begin with, let’s consider the concept of hip-hop. Suppose we are listening to a new hip-hop song,
and we start wondering about the degree to which it is continuous with the existing tradition of  hip-hop
music. It will be helpful here to distinguish two different ways in which we might do this.
First, we might ask whether the new song is similar to previous hip-hop songs. Some hip-hop songs
are similar to previous songs, whereas others take things in radically new directions. This distinction might be
important for various purposes.
But, importantly, we could also ask a very different question. We could ask whether the new song
embodies what hip-hop is really all about. In this latter inquiry, we also seem to be looking at some kind of
continuity with the past, but the continuity in question is of  a very different type. We aren't just asking
whether the new song is similar to the previous songs. Instead, we are doing something more complex. We
look at the existing hip-hop songs, extract from them some deeper property (“what hip-hop is really all
about”), and then ask whether the new song has that deeper property.
Importantly, this approach might yield very different judgments from the ones we would arrive at if
we were just judging based on similarity. People might think that a particular song is not very similar at all to
previous hip-hop songs and yet nonetheless believe that this song fully embodies what hip-hop is really all
about. Or, conversely, people might think that a particular song is in most respects pretty similar to previous
hip-hop songs and yet nonetheless believe that this song fails to embody what hip-hop is really all about.
One can then use this same approach when applying numerous other concepts. One can ask
whether a new religious practice embodies what Christianity is all about, whether a new law embodies what
the United States is all about, whether a particular scientist embodies what being a scientist is all about, and so
forth. In each case, this approach enables us to think about a certain kind of  continuity with the past, but in
each case, that continuity is clearly not just a matter of  similarity to past exemplars.
Let’s now introduce some terminology that allows us to talk about these sorts of  judgments. Instead
of  saying “what X is really all about,” I will sometimes speak of  the characteristic values of  X. So I will be
speaking in what follows about the characteristic values of  hip-hop, the characteristic values of  Christianity,
and so forth.
Ultimately, our goal will be to use the notion of characteristic values to understand the moral change
intuition, but first we will need to get clear in a more general way on the role of  these judgments in people’s
cognition.
Characteristic values are not a matter of  the featuresan object actually has
Judgments about the degree to which an object embodies the characteristic values of  a concept
should not be seen as just some minor variation on the idea of  checking for similarity; it is a fundamentally
different thing.
Suppose we want to determine whether something is similar to a given object X. We would do this by
trying to figure out whether that thing has the features that X has. For present purposes, it will be important
to emphasize one specific aspect of  this process:
The degree to which something is similar to object X is a matter of  the degree to which it has certain
features. But object X itself  always has all of  thosefeatures.
An obvious corollary is that nothing can ever be more similar to X than X is to itself. This is a pretty
fundamental fact about the nature of  similarity.
Although this might all seem pretty obvious and straightforward, it will perhaps be helpful to take a
moment just to hammer home the key point. Suppose we are thinking about contemporary science (i.e., the
practice of  science as it exists right now). We might imagine various possible ways in which science could
change, and we could ask how similar each of  thosepossibilities would be to contemporary science. In doing
so, we would be asking whether those other possibilities have certain features. However, contemporary
science itself  would have all of  the features we wereasking about. Thus, these other possibilities might be
more or less similar to contemporary science, but none of  them could ever be more similar to contemporary
science than contemporary science is to itself.
The notion of  embodying characteristic values doesnot work like that. To determine whether
something embodies the characteristic values of  X,we arrive at a judgment of  the characteristic valuesof  X,
and then ask whether something embodies those values. But now notice an important fact:
The degree to which something embodies the characteristic values of  object X is a matter of  the
degree to which it embodies certain values. But object X might not itself  perfectly embody all of
those values.
A corollary is that something else might embody the characteristic values of  X more perfectly than Xdoes
itself.
To illustrate, consider again the example of  contemporary science. If  we want to know whether
something embodies the characteristic values of  contemporary science, we will need to have some
understanding of  what the characteristic values of contemporary science are. But will we conclude that
contemporary science itself  perfectly embodies thesevalues? Surely not. Thus, we might well think that some
other practice – one that is a lot like contemporary science but that differs in a few specific respects – would
actually more fully embody the characteristic values of  contemporary science than contemporary sciencedoes
itself.
If  we are going to successfully make sense of  thissort of  judgment, we will need a conception of
characteristic values according to which things can fail to perfectly embody their own characteristic values.
Existing research has led to the development of  anumber of  different theories that aim to do this.One family
of  theories says that people's ability to attributecharacteristic values is closely tied to teleology (e.g., Rose, Tobia
& Schaffer, 2018), while another says that it is closely tied to psychological essentialism (e.g., Bailey, Knobe &
Newman, in press; Newman, & Knobe, 2019; Ritchie & Knobe, in press). Some recent work has sought to
unify these two approaches in a theory of  'teleological essentialism' (Rose & Nichols, 2019). Nothing in what
follows will depend on the resolution of  this controversy, and we can therefore remain neutral as between the
different possible theories.
Instead, the key point in what follows will be a relatively straightforward one that should be
compatible with any plausible theory. That point is that what an object is “really all about” is not just a matter
of  features that the object actually has and that, as a result, an object can sometimes fail to perfectly embody
the very thing that it is really all about.
When and why do people care about characteristic values?
A question now arises as to why people care about characteristic values and what role they play in
people’s lives. As far as I know, no existing research has tackled this question directly. I will therefore
introduce a tentative hypothesis, which could be put to the test in future empirical work.
Consider a case in which people think that an object falls under a given concept. Now suppose that
people conclude that the object fails to embody the characteristic values of  that concept. In such cases,people
will tend to think that something has gone wrong.
As an example, suppose we arrive at a conception of  the characteristic values of  punk rock. We
might then conclude that almost all music does not embody those values. (For example, Bach's partitas don't
embody the characteristic values of  punk rock.) But in most cases, we would not regard this as a problem.
There is no particular reason why most music ought to embody the characteristic values of  punk rock, and
there is therefore nothing wrong with cases in which it does not. However, something different happens
when we conclude that a given piece of  music actually is punk rock but nonetheless fails to embody the
characteristic values of  punk rock. In those cases, there is a mismatch, and we might feel that something has
gone wrong.
This phenomenon also seems to arise for numerous other concepts. Consider the characteristic
values of  philosophy. Presumably, people would think that most objects do not embody these characteristic
values. (Math papers, action movies and punk rock songs typically do not embody the characteristic values of
philosophy.) Yet none of  this is itself  a problem.However, it does seem that there is a problem when a
philosophy paper fails to embody the characteristic values of  philosophy. In that case, there is a mismatch,
and people may feel that something has gone wrong.
In introducing this idea, I mean to be making a very weak claim. The point is not that people will
necessarily think that it would be better all-things-considered for every object to embody the characteristic
values of  the concepts it falls under. In some cases, they might think that there are also strong countervailing
reasons that outweigh this one. Similarly, the point is not that people specifically think that the best way to
address these mismatches is by changing the object so that it embodies the right characteristic values. In some
cases, people might think it would be better to make the opposite change. For example, if  a philosophypaper
fails to embody the characteristic values of  philosophybut does embody the characteristic values of  math,
people might think that the best way to address the mismatch is to turn the paper into a straight-up math
paper.
With any luck, future empirical research will more directly put this claim to the test. For the moment,
I adopt it as a provisional hypothesis. If  it formsa part of  a package that, taken together, providesan
explanation for the moral change intuition, this explanation will itself  provide at least some small measure of
empirical support for the hypothesis itself.
Dual character statements
Consider now cases in which people represent an object as falling under a concept but think that the
object fails to embody the values associated with that concept. A series of  studies have explored the
statements people are inclined to use in cases like this (Knobe et al., 2013).
For example, consider the hypothetical scientist we discussed in the introduction. As we noted there,
participants who receive this example tend to agree with both of  the following statements:
(1) There is a sense in which this person is a scientist.
(2) Ultimately when you think about what it really means to be a scientist, you would have to say that
this person is not truly a scientist.
This result seems to suggest that people actually have two different sets of  criteria for determining whether
someone counts as a scientist. One set of  criteria involves more superficial features, while the other involves
characteristic values. For this reason, concepts like the concept of  being a scientist are known asdual character
concepts.
Interestingly, in existing studies on dual character concepts, it is not as though one sample of
participants receives a sentence like (1) and another, completely separate sample of  participants receives a
sentence like (2). Rather, each individual participant receives both sentences. So participants are agreeing with
both of  these sentences even when they see them back to back. Indeed, participants agree even when they are
conjoined to form a single sentence.
There’s a sense in which she is clearly a scientist, but ultimately, if  you think about what it really
means to be a scientist, you'd have to say that there is a sense in which she is not a scientist at all.
Sentences of  this form have played a large role in the study of  dual character concepts, and they have
sometimes been referred to as “dual character statements.” Studies show that people generally think that dual
character statements make sense when used with dual character concepts but do not make sense when used
with other concepts (Knobe et al., 2013). For example, participants think that the following sentences make
sense:
There's a sense in which she is clearly a friend, but ultimately, if  you think about what it reallymeans
to be a friend, you'd have to say that there is a sense in which she is not a friend at all.
There's a sense in which this is clearly a poem, but ultimately, if  you think about what it really means
to be a poem, you'd have to say that there is a sense in which this is not a poem at all.
But they think that the following sentences do not make sense:
There's a sense in which she is clearly a second cousin, but ultimately, if  you think about what it
really means to be a second cousin, you'd have to say that there is a sense in which she is not a
second cousin at all.
There's a sense in which this is clearly a table of contents, but ultimately, if  you think about what it
really means to be a table of  contents, you'd have to say that there is a sense in which this is not a
table of  contentsat all.
Drawing on this finding, previous studies have used agreement with dual character statements as a measure of
the degree to which concepts show dual character (Liao et al., 2020).
People’s use of  dual character statements raises a host of  deep and very difficult issues. Those issues
have been discussed in a number of  existing papers (Del Pinal & Reuter, 2017; Guo et al., in press; Knobe et
al., 2013; Leslie, 2015; Liao et al., 2020; Reuter, 2019), but I think it’s fair to say that they have not yet been
satisfactorily resolved. Further research on this topic is clearly needed.
In what follows, we will not be attempting to make progress on the broader questions that arise here.
Instead, we will be focusing just on one very specific issue. Consider the second conjunct within a dual
character statement. These are sentences like “Ultimately, she is not a scientist at all” or “Ultimately, this is not
a poem at all.” We can refer to these as ultimately-not statements. When a person uses an ultimately-not
statement, what exactly does she thereby accomplish?
Downstream effects
In thinking about this question, it will be helpful to explore some specific examples. As we will see,
even a brief  look at some examples suggests that thingsare not exactly the way we might have expected them
to be if  we had just considered the matter in theabstract.
Imagine that you are thinking about what is so deeply valuable in the work of  Biggie, Tupac, Nas...
when you are interrupted by the sound of  some newsong on your local hip-hop radio station. Now suppose
you use an ultimately-not statement: “Ultimately, this isn’t even hip-hop at all.” What exactly are you doing
when you use a sentence like this?
The first thing to note is that you seem to be disparaging the object you are discussing. Any account of
these sentences that left out the disparagement would be missing something very fundamental. But the
disparagement here is a complex one, and it might at first be difficult to see precisely how sentences like these
can serve to disparage the objects they discuss.
To begin with, notice that it would not normally be considered disparaging to say that a song is not
hip-hop. Lots of  songs are not hip-hop, and there is nothing wrong with that. Of  course, one might add that
the sentence seems to be suggesting that the song doesn’t embody the characteristic values of  hip-hop,but
that addition doesn’t immediately address what is puzzling here. After all, lots of  songs don’t embody the
characteristic values of  hip-hop, and there is nothingwrong with that either. The disparagement in this case
seems to arise from something very specific about the application of  the claim to a case involving theuse of  a
dual character concept. Let us therefore refer to it as a dual character diss.
Very roughly, the force of  a dual character diss comes from the combination of  two elements. On
one hand, a certain object does fall under a concept, but on the other hand, the object does not embody those
characteristic values. Thus, there is a mismatch. In some important sense the object is failing to be the very
thing it actually is.
The phenomenon of  dual character disses is a pervasiveone, which arises in numerous different
domains. Suppose you read through this paper and say: “Ultimately, this isn’t even really philosophy.” You
would thereby be disparaging the paper, but only because there is a clear sense in which this paper is
philosophy. Or suppose that a racist is talking about a member of  some other racial group and says:
“Ultimately, she isn’t even really human.” This is a way of  disparaging that person – perhaps the worst thing
that can be said about a person – but even here, one can only see that the sentence is disparaging if one
understands that she actually is human (Phillips, 2021; cf. Smith, this volume).
In short, ultimately-not statements seem to have quite distinctive downstream effects. Consider again
our ultimately-not statement:
Ultimately, this isn’t even hip-hop at all.
One might at first think that the downstream effects of  a statement like this one would be at least roughly
similar to the downstream effects of  a more straightforwardstatement saying that something does not fall
under a concept. For example, one might think that they would be at least roughly similar to the downstream
effects that would arise if  someone were simply wonderingwhether a song was hip-hop and you answered:
No, that one isn’t hip-hop.
I have been trying to suggest that this is actually not the case. The downstream effects of  an ultimately-not
statement aren’t even roughly similar to the effects of  these more straightforward statements. Rather, the
downstream effects of  an ultimately-not statementare closely tied to the idea of  amismatch. Fundamentally,
what an ultimately-not statement is doing is saying that there is a mismatch between what an object is and
which values it embodies.
Summary
Thus far, we have been developing a framework for understanding dual character concepts. This
framework includes claims about the criteria people use in applying such concepts (characteristic values),
about the linguistic expressions associated with them (dual character statements), and about the role of such
linguistic expressions in people’s lives (dual character disses).
The dual character framework was originally developed to understand a class of  concepts that might
seem quite distant from questions about personal identity, and we have been exploring that framework
through a discussion of  those other concepts. Thekey question in what follows will be whether this very
same framework can also give us insight into the moral change intuition.
2. Normative standards and similarity
Admittedly, however, this is not the obvious place to go in looking for an explanation. A more
natural approach would be to look to the frameworks developed within existing research on the way people
think about personal identity over time. Recent studies show that these frameworks have been extraordinarily
successful in explaining numerous different phenomena that seem closely related to personal identity, and one
might therefore be tempted to assume that they can also be used to explain the moral change intuition.
A core goal of  much of  this recent research has beento understand the way people think about the
various normative standards associated with being a particular person. If  we determine that a particular
person is me, it immediately seems to follow that this person ought to treat others in certain ways and ought
to be treated in certain ways by others. If  a person is me, that person has to keep my promises, teach my
courses, raise my children. And, similarly, if  a person is me, that person should be cared for by my friends,
should be punished for my misdeeds, and so forth.
So then, how do people actually make judgments about whether a person has these normative
statuses? Experimental work on this question has been deeply influenced by frameworks coming out of
philosophy. Some philosophical theories suggest that personal identity is not a matter of  continuity of the
body but rather a matter of  continuity of  the mind(Locke, 1690). But, as philosophers have noted, continuity
of  the mind seems to be a matter of  degree (Parfit,1984). If  you undergo a radical change of  personality,you
might be said to have a lower degree of  continuity in this respect than if  your personality remainspretty much
constant. Experimental work has drawn on this idea in exploring the ways in which people ordinarily attribute
normative standards. For example, consider a person who undergoes various changes, in the normal way, over
the course of  a number of  years. Depending on variousfactors, such a person’s psychology might change
relatively little, or it might change quite a lot. Systematic studies show that this difference has an important
effect on how people regard the agent after the change. People are less concerned with the welfare of  their
own future self  if  they believe that they will undergovery substantial psychological changes in the future
(Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Bartels, Kvaran & Nichols, 2013), and they are less inclined to punish a person for
her former misdeeds if  she underwent substantial psychological changes in the time since those misdeeds
(Mott, 2018).
This line of  research seems to be pointing to something truly profound about the way people
ordinarily understand identity over time, and it raises some fundamental, and philosophically rich, questions
about the relationship between personal identity and normative status (e.g., Hershfield & Bartels, 2018;
Tierney, 2020). In the present paper, however, I will not be grappling with those questions. Instead, I just
want to focus in on one very specific issue. Should we be using the framework coming out of  this recent
research to understand the moral change intuition?
In addressing this issue, it might be helpful to start by making two simple points. First, at a very
straightforward level, the thing being measured in this line of  research is different from the thingbeing
measured in studies on the moral change intuition. Studies in this line of  research are concerned with the
degree to which participants are inclined to help a person, or to blame a person, or to punish a person. By
contrast, studies on the moral change intuition are concerned with the degree to which people agree with
statements like “The man after the accident is not really Phineas.” Of  course, one might well think that the
very same psychological processes that explain the former will also explain the latter. This is a plausible view
– and I agree that it is an obvious first place to start – but all the same, it is clearly an empirical hypothesis. It
might well turn out to be correct, but it is also possible that it will turn out to be wrong.
Second, in the previous section, I introduced a somewhat complex framework for thinking about
certain kinds of  continuity, but no one has suggested that this complex framework would be necessary for
understanding the phenomena being studied in this other line of  research, and my sense is that sucha
suggestion wouldn't even be plausible. Those other phenomena really are just a matter of similarity.
For example, Mott (2018) looked at judgments about punishment. The results showed that if  you
perform a morally bad act and then change a lot, people are disinclined to punish you for the act you
performed before the change. This is a fascinating finding, but it doesn't seem at all helpful to think of  it
using the framework I introduced in the previous section. It is not that people are disinclined to punish you
because they think that you are failing to embody what the person who performed the original act was really
all about. Rather, the effect here seems to be driven by a straightforward judgment regarding similarity. People
are disinclined to punish you because you are now so different from the way you were at the time you
performed the act.
In sum, existing research on intuitions about personal identity has uncovered some very surprising
effects on people's judgments about normative standards, and those judgments appear to be driven by
perceived similarity. What we want to know now is whether the frameworks that have proven so helpful in
explaining these effects will help us in understanding the moral change intuition.
3. The moral change intuition
To address this question, let's now turn to existing empirical work on the moral change intuition. We
will be focusing on four major findings.
Moral vs. non-moral
Strohminger and Nichols (2014) reported a series of studies that looked at which specific changes led
to the intuition that personal identity was disrupted. For example, in one study, all participants were asked to
imagine a person named Jim who suffers a brain injury in a car accident. They were then randomly assigned
to be told that one specific aspect of  Jim’s previous mental states was lost as a result: his memories, his
desires, his perceptual abilities, or his moral conscience. Participants were then asked about the degree to
which they agreed with the sentence: “The transplant recipient is still Jim.”
In a striking result, Strohminger and Nichols found that a loss of  moral conscience led to a different
pattern of  responses than any of  the other sorts ofpsychological changes. In all other conditions, participants
tended on the whole to agree with this sentence, but in the condition where Jim loses his moral conscience,
they tended on the whole to disagree.
This same finding also emerged in numerous further studies, including everything from studies in
which participants are asked to imagine that one person’s soul enters another person’s body to studies on
people whose spouses actually are undergoing psychological changes due to dementia (Heiphetz, Strohminger
& Young, 2017; Prinz & Nichols, 2016; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; Strohminger & Nichols, 2015). There
seems to be a pervasive tendency whereby people’s use of  these sentences is much more affected by changes
in moral traits than by other sorts of  changes.
This is not the pattern we would have expected to find if  we thought that these intuitions were driven
by straightforward judgments of  similarity. After all, similarity does not seem to be just a matter of  having the
same moral traits; it seems to be a matter of  having the same features more generally (same memories, same
preferences, etc.). We might be able to accommodate this result on a theory that emphasizes similarity, but to
do so, we would have to introduce some additional complexities into our account of  the similarity judgment
that plays a role here. For example, we could say that it isn’t a matter of  similarity across the boardbut rather a
matter of  similarity in one specific respect (e.g., similarity with regard to moral traits).
Good vs. bad
Thus far, we have seen that intuitions about personal identity depend especially on changes in moral
traits, but does it matter whether those changes involve morally good traits or morally bad traits?
To address this question, Tobia (2015) conducted an elegant experiment. Participants were randomly
assigned to receive either a vignette in which Phineas loses morally good traits or morally bad traits. In the
condition in which the morality good traits are lost, participants received the vignette quoted at the beginning
of  this paper. In the condition in which morally bad traits are lost, participants received a modified version
[changes in boldface type] :
Phineas is extremely cruel; he really enjoys harming people. He is also employed as a railroad
worker. One day at work, a railroad explosion causes a large iron spike to fly out and into his head,
and he is immediately taken for emergency surgery. The doctors manage to remove the iron spike
and their patient is fortunate to survive. However, in some ways this man after the accident is
remarkably different from Phineas before the accident. Phineas before the accident was extremely
cruel and enjoyed harming people, but the man after the accident is now extremely kind; he even
enjoys helping people.
In both conditions, participants were asked whether they thought that the man after the accident was not
Phineas.
The results showed a surprising asymmetry. In the condition where the morally good traits are lost,
participants’ ratings were at about the midpoint of the scale (indicating that they were uncertain whether to
say that the man after the accident was Phineas). By contrast, in the condition where the morally bad traits
were lost, participants were specifically inclined to say that personal identity was not disrupted and that the
man after the accident was still Phineas.
Subsequent studies found similar effects with other materials (Earp, Skorburg, Everett & Savulescu,
2019), across a wide variety of  cultures and languages (Dranseika et al., unpublished data), and even in studies
with children (Lefebvre & Krettenauer, 2020). For example, in a study that we will be discussing further below
(Tobia, 2015; based on a case from Parfit, 1984), participants were given a vignette about a Russian nobleman.
In one condition, participants were told that he started out with egalitarian ideals and then lost those ideals
(morally good traits lost). In the other condition, participants were told that he started out with empty
egalitarian ideals and then lost those ideals (morally bad traits lost). Participants were more inclined to say that
the person after the loss of  ideals was not the sameas the original nobleman in the condition where morally
good traits were lost.
This pattern in the results looks even farther from the pattern one would expect if  these intuitions
were driven by similarity judgments. To hold onto the idea that these intuitions are driven by similarity
judgments, we would therefore have to introduce even more complexity into account of  the similarity
judgments themselves. Not only would we need to say that they are a matter of  similarity in one specific
respect, we would have to say that the notion of  similarity at work here is asymmetric. Notice the structure of
the studies we are discussing. In both conditions, the person is described as undergoing a change between the
very same two states (being morally good, being morally bad), and the only difference is the direction in
which the person is moving (good to bad vs. bad to good). Thus, to explain this result in terms of  similarity,
we would have to say that being morally good is seen as more similar to being morally bad than being morally
bad is seen as similar to being morally good.
At this point, it is beginning to seem that the concept of  similarity is not actually playing any helpful
role in explaining the results. What the studies show is that people are especially inclined to use a certain sort
of  sentence in cases where a person fails to showa morally good trait that he or she showed previously. We
might be able to rig up a very complex account of similarity that allowed us to accommodate this result, but is
the concept of  similarity actually helping us in anyway to make sense of  it?
Beyond human beings
So far, we have been looking at intuitions about human beings and their psychological states. A
question arises, however, as to whether these same effects would emerge if  one looked at other typesof
objects.
In a series of  studies, De Freitas and colleagues therefore took the effect that Tobia found for
intuitions about Phineas and asked whether that same effect would emerge for intuitions about non-human
objects (De Freitas, Tobia, Newman & Knobe, 2017). For example, in one study, participants were asked to
imagine a physics paper called “Atom Dynamics.” They were told that the authors revised the paper, deleting
some of  the existing sections and adding some newsections. In one condition, participants were told that
these changes involved eliminating all of  the goodparts of  the paper, while in the other condition,
participants were told that these changes involve eliminating all of  the bad sections of  the paper.All
participants were then asked whether the paper after the changes genuinely was “Atom Dynamics.” The
results showed the same effect observed for people's intuitions about persons. Participants were more
inclined to say that the paper was no longer really “Atom Dynamics” when it lost its good properties. This
effect also arose for nonhuman objects of  many other types: a university, a nation, a conference, a rock band.
In short, when we look specifically at intuitions about human beings, we find a difference between
losing good traits and losing bad traits. But this effect does not appear to be due to something unique about
human beings. Rather, it seems to be just one instance of  a far more general effect involving a difference
between losing good properties and losing bad properties.
Downstream effects
We have seen that people are more inclined to have a certain sort of  intuition when a person loses
morally good traits then when that person loses morally bad traits. A question now arises about the
downstream effects of  this intuition. If  people aremore inclined to think that the man after the accident is
not really Phineas when he loses morally good traits, what impact will this have on the way they actually think
about or interact with him?
Work on the role of  similarity has emphasized onespecific type of  downstream effect. Specifically,
this work points to an impact of  similarity judgmentson intuitions about normative standards. Does the
moral change intuition work in that very same way? If  people are more inclined to think that the manafter
the accident is not truly Phineas when he loses morally good traits, will they be less inclined to think that the
normative standards that applied to the original Phineas still apply after he loses morally good traits?
Although existing studies have not explored this question using the Phineas case in particular, Earp
and colleagues explored this question by looking at intuitions about advance directives (Earp, Latham &
Tobia, 2020). Suppose Robin signs an official document saying that if  she ever ends up in a certain kindof
medical condition, she does not want to be resuscitated. Subsequently, she undergoes radical psychological
change as a result of  dementia, and she either losesher morally good traits or her morally bad traits. Then the
person who exists after the psychological change gets pneumonia and ends up in precisely the medical
condition described by the advance directive. Should the doctors’ treatment of  the person after the onsetof
dementia be governed by the advance directive that the original Robin signed?
The question being asked here has very much the same structure as the questions asked in the many
existing studies on personal identity and normative standards. There is a normative standard that applies to a
person before a change (the advanced directive), followed by a change in that person‘s psychological states
(the onset of  dementia). Participants are then askeda question design to see whether they continue to apply
the normative standard even after this change. The key question is whether participants will be less inclined to
apply the normative standard when the change involves the loss of  morally good traits than when the change
involves the loss of  morally bad traits. Strikingly, the results showed that people were not less inclined to apply
the normative standard when the change involved a loss of  morally good traits. That is, there was noeffect at
all such that participants were less inclined to think that the doctors should obey the advance directive in the
condition where morally good traits were lost than in the condition where morally bad traits were lost.
Because this study came out only very recently, I worry that the field might not yet have absorbed its
full significance. Previous studies consistently find that people are more inclined to have a certain sort of
intuition when morally good traits are lost than when the morally bad traits are lost, and a question now arises
about the downstream effects of  that intuition. Theobvious first hypothesis would be that it has exactly the
same sorts of  downstream effects that have been demonstrated in numerous existing studies on the effects of
similarity judgments. But we are now getting some evidence that it does not have those same sorts of
downstream effects. This provides at least some reason to suspect that it is not the same thing but is
something else entirely.
Summary
Our aim here has been to understand the intuition people express when they use sentences like: “The
man after the accident isn’t even really Phineas.” One initial question we face is whether this intuition can be
straightforwardly explained using the sorts of  frameworks that come out of  the existing philosophical
literature on personal identity or whether we will need a new sort of  framework to understand it.
To make progress on this question, we reviewed four findings from the existing empirical literature:
(1) People’s use of  these sentences is especially affected by changes in moral traits and (2) even more so by the
loss of  morally good traits. (3) This same basic patternarises for the way people describe things other than
human beings. (4) Although the loss of  morally good traits has an especially large impact on use of  these
sentences, it does not have an especially large impact on people’s intuition about the normative standards that
apply to the person after the loss. None of  these findings seems to follow in any obvious way from the
frameworks that have been so successful in helping us understand the relationship between normative
standards and psychological similarity.
So then, how are the findings to be explained? One possible approach would be to try fiddling with
the frameworks developed within this prior work. We might then end up with something that resembled
those frameworks but that also differed from them in various details. For example, we might say that people
have some very complex notion of  similarity that is actually asymmetric. Or we might say that, for some
complex reason, intuitions about personal identity don’t have the impact one might think they would on
judgments about advance directives.
Although there is a chance that this strategy will ultimately prove successful, I will be pursuing a very
different approach. On the view I will be developing, these findings do not provide any reason to revise
existing frameworks. Those frameworks are fine just as they are; the issue is simply that the moral change
intuition is completely unrelated to the phenomena they were originally designed to explain. Thus, if we want
to explain the moral change intuition, we will have to switch over to an entirely different approach.
4. The moral change intuition and dual character concepts
Let’s therefore shift gears and ask instead whether we can make sense of  these results within the
framework introduced to understand dual character concepts. On the hypothesis I will be proposing, it is not
just that there is some loose analogy between the moral change intuition and dual character concepts. Rather,
the moral change intuition simply is an example of the use of  a dual character concept.
On this view, then, what people are doing when they say “The man after the accident isn’t really
Phineas“ is deeply similar to what people are doing when they say things like “Ultimately, this song isn’t really
hip-hop.” The best way of  understanding the sentenceabout Phineas is through an application of  the
framework that was first developed to understand those other cases.
Now, of  course, these two cases look very different from a metaphysical perspective. In the former
case, we have a concept that applies to various different objects. We are now thinking about a particular object,
and we are wondering whether this concept applies to it. By contrast, in the latter case, we have a concept that
applies to various different time slices of  a person, i.e, to what metaphysicians sometimes call person-stages. We
are now thinking about a particular person-stage, and we are wondering whether the concept applies to it.
Clearly, there is an important difference between thinking about objects and thinking about person-stages.
Given this obvious difference, it would certainly be reasonable to suspect that it won't be possible to
find a single overarching framework that helps make sense of  both sorts of  cases. Nonetheless, I willbe
arguing that the dual character framework actually does capture a more abstract structure that applies across
both. To see how this might work, we need to engage in a more detailed examination of  the moral change
intuition itself.
Dual character statements
As we noted above, one way to test whether a concept has dual character is to see whether people
are willing to use it in sentences of  a specific formthat we have called “dual character statements.” To see
whether people are inclined to express the moral change intuition using sentences of  this form, I conducteda
simple experiment.
Two hundred and five participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. All participants
received one of  Tobia's (2015) vignettes about Phineas.Participants in one condition received the version in
which Phineas loses morally good traits; participants in the other condition received the version in which
Phineas loses morally bad traits. All participants then received the dual character statement:
There's a sense in which the man after the accident is clearly still Phineas, but ultimately, if  you think
about what it really means to be Phineas, you'd have to say that he is not truly Phineas at all.
Participants rated this statement on a scale from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’).
Ratings in the condition where the morally good traits were lost (M = 5.5, SD = 1.4) were
significantly higher than were ratings in the condition where the morally bad traits were lost (M = 4.6, SD =
1.7), t(204)=3.7, p < .001.  (All data and R code for this study are available at https://osf.io/w842x/)
To get a better understanding of  these results, itmight be helpful to compare them to the results of
the original Tobia study. Figure 1 shows the original Tobia results; Figure 2 shows the present results.
Figure 1. Jittered plot showing the results of  Tobia (2015) . Each colored point represents the rating given by one
individual participant. Black circles show the means for each condition. Error bars show 95% CI.
Figure 2. Jittered plot showing the results of  thepresent study. Each colored point represents the rating given by one
individual participant. Black circles show the means for each condition. Error bars show 95% CI.
This simple study yields two findings that we will be trying to explain.
First, in the condition where morally good traits were lost, participants tended on the whole to agree
with the dual character statement. This result contrasts with the result from the original Tobia study. In that
original study, participants showed at least some willingness to say that the man after the accident was not
truly Phineas, but it was not the case that they actually tended on the whole to agree with that statement.
What we find here is that when participants are given the more complex dual character statement, the
majority actually agree. The obvious conclusion would be that this more complex statement more accurately
captures their opinions about this case.
Second, the results from the condition in which morally bad traits were lost were very different from
the results in the conditions in which morally good traits were lost. In the condition in which morally bad
traits were lost, participants’ judgments were all over the place. Some agreed with the dual character
statement, others disagreed. Thus, an adequate account of  people’s judgments in these cases needs to explain
why this second condition is different from the first and why it leads to so much disagreement in people’s
intuitions.
In sum, the present study provides at least some evidence for the hypothesis that the moral change
intuition is best understood in terms of  dual character concepts. The key question now is whether we can use
the dual character framework to explain the exact pattern of  intuitions that people show in these cases.
Criteria
Consider the original Phineas, as he existed before the accident. In the actual text of  the vignettes
participants received, there is a certain amount of information about what the original Phineas was actually
like, and this information makes it clear that he was morally good in one condition, morally bad in the other.
But to apply the dual character framework, we need to look at something that goes beyond just what Phineas
was actually like. We need to look at what he was really all about. Importantly, these two things might sometimes
differ substantially; what Phineas was actually like might involve a failure to embody the characteristic values
that constituted what he was really all about.
What will participants conclude in each of  these conditionsabout what Phineas was really all about?
This sort of  question has been explored in a numberof  recent studies, and we now have at least someamount
of  evidence regarding the answer. When an agent isdescribed as having morally good features, people tend to
think that the agent is fundamentally morally good. By contrast, however, when an agent is described as
having morally bad features, people don't just conclude that the agent is fundamentally morally bad. Instead,
people seem to regard this as a difficult or confusing case. Some people say that the agent is morally bad,
while others say that there is some sense in which, deep down, the agent is morally good (Newman, De
Freitas & Knobe, 2015).
Of  course, further questions immediately arise as to why people think about morally bad agents in
this way. These questions have been a major preoccupation of  recent work in this area. The tendency people
show in these cases seems to be related to a more general tendency to believe that, deep down, all agents are
morally good (Newman, Bloom & Knobe, 2014; Strohminger, Knobe & Newman, 2017), which in turn
seems to be related to an even more general tendency to think that all objects, including non-human objects,
have good essences (e.g., De Freitas, Tobia, Newman & Knobe, 2017). The question as to how to explain this
more general tendency is a difficult one, and I don't have anything new to contribute to it here. The key point
for present purposes is just that if  people’s judgmentsdo show this pattern, we can use those judgments to
explain the moral change intuition.
First, consider the condition in which Phineas loses his morally good traits. In that condition, people
tend to think that the man after the accident is failing to embody the characteristic values of  the original
Phineas. For this reason, they say that, ultimately, the man after the accident is not truly Phineas.
Now consider the condition where Phineas loses his morally bad traits. In that condition, the man
after the accident is certainly very dissimilar from the original Phineas, so if  these intuitions weredriven by
similarity judgments, people should again say that the man after the accident is not Phineas. However, on the
view we have been developing, these intuitions are not driven by similarity judgments. Instead, they are driven
by judgments about characteristic values.
This gives us a very different way of  explaining the results in that condition. Given the way in which
people attribute characteristic values, it seems likely that people will be all over the place when it comes to
judgments about what the original Phineas was really all about. Some people will think that the cruelty he
shows on the surface is what he is really all about, while others will think that despite the features he shows
on the surface, what he was really all about was something more morally good. These different people should
have different intuitions about whether the man after the accident embodies the characteristic values of the
original Phineas. Those people who think that what the original Phineas was all about was something morally
bad should conclude that the man after the accident does not embody the characteristic values of  theoriginal
Phineas, but those participants who think that what the original Phineas was all about was something morally
good should reach the opposite conclusion. They should conclude that the man after the accident embodies
the characteristic values of  the original Phineaseven more than the original Phineas himself  did.
Downstream effects
When one first encounters the moral change intuition, it is only natural to seek to understand it in
terms of  a familiar web of  concerns involving normativestandards. After all, if  we learn that a particular
person is Phineas, we immediately begin to attribute to that person certain normative standards. He has to
fulfill Phineas’s promises, he has the right to use Phineas’s possessions, he should be punished for Phineas’s
misdeeds, and so forth. If  someone says that the manafter the accident is not truly Phineas, an obvious first
thought is that this person is saying that some of these normative standards do not fully apply to the man
after the accident.
I have been arguing that the moral change intuition should not be understood in this way. It doesn’t
have anything to do with any of  the concerns that are familiar from the existing literature on personal identity.
Rather, it should be understood as closely connected to the use of  ultimately-not sentences with dual
character concepts.
As soon as one begins thinking in this way, a completely different set of  concerns immediately
suggest themselves. Suppose we think about Phineas and thereby extract a view about what he is all about. We
could then pick out any person and ask whether that person embodies Phineas's characteristic values. For
example, we could ask whether Barack Obama embodies Phineas's characteristic values, or whether Alexander
the Great embodies those values. Yet, though we could ask this question about any arbitrary person, we
usually would not care very much about the answer. However, there is one specific person who has a special
relationship to Phineas's characteristic values. That person is Phineas. To the extent that Phineas fails to
embody what Phineas is all about, it seems that something is going wrong. He is failing to be himself.
This point comes out even more clearly when we consider more ordinary cases. Take the case of  the
Russian nobleman (Parfit, 1984). Suppose you knew the Russian nobleman back when he passionately
believed in the cause of  liberating the serfs. Thenyou see him again, years later, and he seems interested only
in preserving his own power and privilege. You say: “It isn't even really him anymore.” What exactly would
you be conveying with a sentence like that?
On the hypothesis we are exploring here, you would be pointing to a certain sort of  mismatch. The
person you are seeing is clearly still the person you once knew, but at the same time, he is tragically failing to
embody the values of  the person you once knew. Therein lies the force of  the claim you are making abouthim
– that he is failing to be the very thing that he is.
5. Conclusion
Our inquiry has been concerned with the relationship between two things. On one hand, there are
very general theories about dual character concepts. On the other, there are a series of  specific empirical
findings concerning the moral change intuition. We have been exploring the hypothesis that the former can
explain the latter.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we have been looking at some theories regarding dual character concepts
in general and at some findings regarding the moral change intuition in particular. If  we consider just the
findings that are already available, it does seem that the theories provide good explanations for the findings.
This gives us at least some reason to suspect that our hypothesis might be on the right track.
But of  course, the hypothesis makes predictions thatgo far beyond anything that can be verified just
by looking at existing findings. In the years to come, we will presumably uncover further facts both about dual
character concepts in general and about the moral change intuition in particular. The hypothesis we have been
exploring makes a prediction about those further facts. It predicts that even after we know much more about
the dual character concepts and about moral change intuition, we will continue to find an explanatory
relationship between the two.
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